188
June 2012 The Journal of American History the first time had to consider and minimize environmental impacts. In the case of loop, coastal scientists and environmental concerns influenced decisions about ways to incorporate environmental safeguards into the project. These ideas were built into all phases of loop and led to a more environmentally sound and safer facility. Similar to the highly publicized Trans Alaska Pipeline System (taps)-another 1970s megaproject-loop was a product of the environmental movement and the energy crisis.
In many ways, the concerns over energy and the environment in the 1970s mirror those over the present-day Gulf of Mexico. The 2010 Macondo well blowout and the resulting oil spill has brought into sharp focus two current national imperatives: how to expand domestic petroleum production from the deepwater Gulf while also protecting and restoring a nationally important ecosystem. As it did in the 1970s, the scientific community may again provide critical solutions to the ongoing technical, regulatory, and environmental problems affecting America's offshore oil and gas industry.
Building a Coastal Pipeline Corridor
Coastal Louisiana is laced with petroleum pipelines. The maze of long, linear canals dredged throughout the wetlands to support these pipelines radically altered the physical environment. In the 1950s, at the dawn of the offshore oil boom, James McConnell, commissioner of the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Agency, recognized the rapid changes occurring in the wetlands: "One does not have to be an expert to fly over our coast and see how drastically industrial expansion has changed the characteristics and ecology of the coast."
2 Not until the 1970s, however, did scientists begin really to understand the relationship between these canals and environmental decline in the wetlands.
The petroleum industry began searching for oil-bearing salt domes in southern Louisiana before World War II. The most prolific oil fields were discovered not in the upland prairies or pastures, but in the vast marshes, swamps, and shallow bays along the coastline. Eventually, the industry migrated to the open waters of the Gulf in search of oil deposits offshore. At each step, changing environmental conditions influenced the choices of technologies.
3 For example, pipeliners first applied traditional dryland equipment and techniques for laying pipelines along the coast, often with limited success. As the industry pushed into the soggy Mississippi delta region, pipeliners came up with innovative and cost-effective techniques for laying bigger and heavier pipelines through extremely difficult marsh terrain.
In the 1940s and 1950s the use of barge-mounted equipment in dredged canals emerged as the most widely accepted technological adaptation for operations in Louisiana's vast coastal wetlands. Without regulatory oversight to govern dredging activities or the incentive to implement less environmentally destructive techniques, this choice of technology became the industry standard for decades. By installing traditional pipe-laying equipment on floating steel barges, pipeline companies were able to create specially designed "lay barges" that allowed for continuous pipe-laying operations under marine conditions. To provide access for these lay barges and other drilling and production equipment to move unimpeded through the region, the industry dug thousands of miles of canals across the marshland. Large land corporations that owned most of the coastal marsh and state and federal regulatory agencies supported the canalization of the wetlands and required few, if any, restrictions on industry development. These activities occurred during a time when most people viewed wetlands as wastelands. The concerns of a few fishermen, trappers, and conservationists about possible long-term adverse ecological effects of these practices were ignored as the industry carved its way to the edge of the Gulf and offshore. Dredging canals and creating mounds of spoil banks across the marsh were viewed as the price for economic development.
This pipeline and canal network set the foundation for establishing a nationally important energy corridor during the postwar decades. As offshore development expanded, the number of canals dredged through the wetlands to accommodate the pipelines and offshore production increased. With each major oil discovery offshore, submarine pipelines were laid from a central gathering facility near the new field back to shore to transport petroleum supplies to processing facilities and eventually to markets. By the 1970s the industry had built approximately 145 major pipelines and countless feeder lines through the marshlands and barrier islands of coastal Louisiana to service the booming offshore industry. 4 The traditional practice of laying large pipelines across the marsh, however, came under closer public scrutiny as evidence of the impact of pipeline canals on land loss began to surface.
At the Intersection of the Energy Crisis and Environmental Reform
The gathering strength of the environmental movement in the late 1960s and three major offshore oil disasters during 1969 and 1970 raised questions about expanding offshore energy development near coastal areas. The old days of "engineering on the run" that characterized rudimentary planning by both industry and government regulators had produced unacceptable environmental damages. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 required an environmental impact statement (eis) for all projects on federal lands, including the Gulf of Mexico. The statements were required to assess the potential environmental impacts of the activity and other alternatives that might lessen any adverse effects. They became a powerful environmental planning tool for industry and government that redefined the ways both sectors approached new projects offshore.
5
The environmental reforms that accompanied the shift in public attitudes coincided with new evidence from coastal scientists that showed Louisiana's wetlands disappearing at an alarming rate. These scientists discovered that cumulative and long-term effects of dredging thousands of miles of man-made canals throughout coastal Louisiana led to salt water intrusion into the marsh and disrupted natural drainage patterns that In the early 1970s a consortium of oil companies (Ashland Oil Company, Marathon Oil Company, Murphy Oil Corporation, Shell Oil Company, and Texaco) and the state of Louisiana initiated plans to build the nation's first deepwater oil port to accommodate increasingly massive ocean-going oil tankers-"very large crude carriers"-from the Middle East that were too large for any American port. The loop concept centered on a series of floating mooring systems located twenty miles offshore. Supertankers would tie up to these offloading terminals and discharge their crude cargo through a large pipeline system that extended inland. Then, millions of gallons of oil traveled by pipeline several miles across coastal wetlands and fed into a hollowed-out underground salt dome for storage prior to distribution to regional and national refineries. With the energy infrastructure and refineries already well established along the Louisiana Gulf Coast, political and business leaders from the Pelican State began a campaign to beat out other states to build the nation's first deepwater port.
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In 1972 the state legislature laid the foundation for the oil port with the passage of the Louisiana Deep Draft Harbor and Terminal Authority Act. This created the Superport Authority, tasked with laying the groundwork for the legal, technical, and environmental aspects of designing and licensing the new port. That same year, a consortium of major oil companies incorporated loop, llc, to build, own, and operate the oil port. The legislation also called for an environmental protection plan (epp) to build in environmental safeguards. This requirement was intended to minimize damages to the environment and to limit the role of outside federal regulators in developing the port. With planning guidelines similar to a federal eis, Louisiana governor Edwin Edwards and state politicians argued successfully throughout the 1970s for the right to license, build, and control loop. In addition, this historic legislation initiated the four-volume Louisiana Superport Studies, the first of many technical and environmental evaluations that developers and regulators used to make decisions throughout the various planning phases of the project. Coastal scientists at the Center for Wetland Resources at Louisiana State University (lsu) conducted the environmental research for these studies, which in turn had a large influence on how the project evolved. ecologists joined a team of well-established geologists and geographers at lsu. Combined with funding from a newly established Louisiana Sea Grant program, this core group of scientists brought to the public's attention the myriad environmental problemsespecially coastal erosion-threatening Louisiana's wetlands. Their studies and research methodologies influenced the design and construction of loop, the planning for the Louisiana Coastal Zone Management Program, and future coastal restoration efforts. These environmental experts were consulted throughout the development of loop to ensure that potential environmental impacts would be carefully researched and that the plans met optimum environmental goals outlined in the legislation. The coordination between environmental consultants and loop engineers represented a "new approach to a project of this magnitude," according to the Superport Authority. Louisiana Superport Studies became the basis of environmental research into the planned development and legislative policy regarding the loop facility. The reports in the study stressed the importance of recognizing the onshore impacts of offshore development. These comprehensive reports collected baseline environmental data on the region before construction began to determine potential impacts. They provided recommendations on site selection and on improved technology and techniques for building the pipeline system through the wetlands. The last two volumes of the series led to the formulation of the epp.
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The final epp, drafted by a panel of three directors-two of whom came from the field of environmental science-provided the design criteria and operating procedures used by planners, regulators, engineers, and contractors during loop's site selection, construction, and operational phases. The plan identified a number of potential environmental stresses associated with the oil port, including damages to coastal marshes and estuaries from tanker spills, pipeline construction, and other industry activities. Data retrieved from previous offshore oil spills in the Gulf and from research on loop's preferred offshore location south of Lafourche Parish recognized the presence of a clockwise loop current in the central Gulf (a major concern during the 2010 oil spill from the Macondo well blowout). Models predicted the trajectory of an oil spill at the loop site within this particular current to reach the ecologically productive Barataria estuary along the coast. Scientific assessment convinced the developers to move the offshore terminal five miles to the southwest and away from this current, thus minimizing the threat to these important wetlands from a potential oil spill. The environmental analysis determined that the proposed large-diameter onshore pipeline system would disrupt more than 1,500 acres of prime wetlands. This pipeline and its dredged canal crossed through the entire estuarine range of coastal marsh. Canals served as conduits for salt water intrusion from the Gulf that destroyed fresh water habitats inland and converted marshes to open water. Coastal scientists warned of the importance in maintaining those various salinity regimes, hydrological patterns, and habitat conditions. In an effort to respond to these concerns, loop planners, with consultation from environmental scientists and environmental engineers, proposed using an alternative construction technique and backfilling the pipeline canal-a novel concept that had long been considered economically unfeasible and unnecessary by the industry and large landowners. Lyle S. St. Amant, a fisheries biologist and one of the three principal authors of the epp, acknowledged the benefit of this new pipeline installation method: "We feel rather certain that it will not cause any problems and it may, indeed, be an answer to the pipeline problem on the Coast."
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From a historical perspective, loop's epp was clearly a departure in environmental planning, operational criteria, and strict performance standards for oil developments along the Gulf Coast. The plan strongly emphasized identifying and compensating for the environmental costs of the project. It called for an initial environmental values assessment of the areas expected to be impacted, followed by the application of "economic-ecologic" formulas-developed largely by academic consultants-to determine the cost-benefit analysis of building loop at alternative sites along the coast. This idea of translating environmental values into economic terms for planning a major pipeline project reflected the shift in attitudes and emphasis on ecological values championed by scholars and advocates of the environmental age. Ian McHarg, the author of the influential book Design with Nature (1969), first promoted the idea of incorporating social and natural values into the cost-benefit analysis of project development; he argued that each construction project should have increased total ecological value over total ecological costs. A final requirement of loop's epp established the procedures for an environmental protection fund to be used to pay for a long-term monitoring program and to compensate for environmental impact, through payments to the proper state officials. 13 loop received its fair share of criticism from the scientific community and from environmentalists. Early on, coastal scientists spoke out in favor of a site closer to the Mississippi delta. They believed that a major oil spill from the loop terminal offshore in an area known as Bay Marchand could be disastrous to the estuaries and fishing communities near Grand Isle. A dispute erupted between academics and industrialists when a leading coastal scientist publically challenged loop's preferred site location. The following year, an outside engineering firm conducted a thorough alternative site selection analysis for loop. Of the three primary alternative sites, the report recommended the original LafourcheBay Marchand area as optimum. The consultants, and loop's planners, based the final site selection on a combination of environmental and economic considerations. , 1969) . Building America's First Offshore Oil Port location represented the shortest route to the Capline pipeline, the nation's main interstate crude line that ran from the Gulf Coast to refineries in the Midwest and the midAtlantic region. loop's distribution also connected to the nearby Clovelly underground storage area, which eliminated the need for large, less secure, above-ground tank farms to store the crude. The Sierra Club, along with some coastal scientists, however, lambasted the planners of loop for ignoring potential alternative sites in favor of the prearranged and least costly route to Capline, which members of the loop consortium also owned and operated.
14 A similar experience occurred in Alaska, where stakeholders fought for several years over the eight-hundred-mile pipeline through one of America's last great wilderness areas. The historical similarities between loop and taps are striking, given that both were the first major oil pipeline projects built under new federal environmental reforms and that both occurred in extremely environmentally sensitive areas. The original 1969 plan for taps called for a large oil pipeline to be buried under the Alaskan permafrost for transporting new reserves discovered in Prudhoe Bay to a tanker terminal at the port of Valdez. taps developers encountered a similar set of new environmental standards and scientific evaluations that, like those for loop, influenced technological choices, project designs, and regulatory response. A major problem occurred with burying a hot oil pipeline underground. Scientists acknowledged that a sharp change in temperature below the surface could cause the permafrost to thaw in the spring, thus resulting in a heaving effect during the winter that could force the pipeline upward. This exposure could cause erosion, damage to wildlife-or worse, a massive oil spill. These kinds of independent scientific investigations led to improved design modifications, including elevating the pipeline high above the tundra. Similarly to critics of loop, opponents of taps strongly criticized the regulators and the industry for not adequately investigating or considering an alternative route through Canada, which would have eliminated the need for a tanker terminal in Valdez. Nevertheless, many critics agreed that the implementation of the environmental impact statement requirement and the four-year delay in conducting the environmental studies produced a safer, more environmentally sound pipeline than originally proposed.
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The level of scientific research that went into formulating loop's Environmental Protection Plan cost several million dollars and probably delayed the project by several years. The benefits of incorporating science into the planning, however, were clearly displayed in loop's environmental record. The offshore oil port did not suffer a major oil spill, nor did the brine disposal process used to hollow out the Clovelly salt dome storage area significantly impact fisheries. Four years after construction, researchers conducted a study of loop's controversial pipeline canal. They determined that the canal actually showed signs of revegetation in some areas, primarily as a result of backfilling and using a modified pipeline installation method.
16 With built-in environmental safeguards and improved techniques for pipeline construction through the marshes, loop planners and When loop opened in 1981, following two years of construction, the developers had spent more than $700 million on a state-of-the-art facility. loop's capacity to offload 1.4 million barrels of oil per day represented more than the total daily production of the Gulf of Mexico during that time. Throughout its first years of operation, however, loop struggled to maintain a profit. The glut in global oil markets in the early 1980s caused a sharp drop in oil prices and a decline in oil imports. As a result of this oil bust, loop had fewer supertankers calling to port and a lower volume of oil throughput than originally anticipated. As consumption rose and imports increased, loop's revenues gradually improved. By the 1990s the offshore oil port accounted for roughly 12 percent of the nation's foreign crude imports. 17 loop in the "Deepwater" Era
The offshore oil and gas industry in the Gulf experienced a transition during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Declining production from the continental shelf pushed the oil companies past the one-thousand-foot depth in the Gulf in search of new supplies to feed America's growing energy demands. Large reserves of petroleum had been discovered in this new frontier, but bringing these supplies to shore posed a major logistical and environmental problem. Dredging long linear canals through the wetlands to lay heavy pipelines from offshore, as the industry had done for decades, was no longer viewed as an appropriate practice. Oil companies turned to loop, with its existing pipeline corridor, underground storage capacity, and proper environmental safeguards, as a way to bring these supplies ashore and limit environmental impacts. loop provided an important link for these new sources of domestic production from the deepwater Gulf of Mexico. It also averted a potentially environmentally destructive expansion of the pipeline network to accommodate new deepwater developments.
In the mid-1990s, more generous federal lease terms, new technologies, and recordbreaking oil discoveries ushered in a new era of deepwater exploration and production that is still ongoing. In response, loop diversified its business plan to provide transportation and storage facilities for major oil companies such as Shell and BP that helped them expand into deep water at the turn of the twenty-first century. The passage of the Deepwater Port Modernization Act of 1996 confirmed loop's statutory authority to receive oil from the deepwater Gulf of Mexico. In 1995 loop signed a deal with Shell to bring in more than one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day from the Mars field, one of the largest discoveries ever made in the Gulf of Mexico, and a key development in the history of deepwater oil. loop also provided an outlet for BP's Thunderhorse deepwater production through the Endymion Oil Pipeline Company and the Mardi Gras Transportation System, one of the largest deepwater pipeline gathering systems in the Gulf. Compared to taps, where a decline in Alaska's Prudhoe Bay field has led to a decline in the pipeline's capacity and raised questions about its future, loop has consistently found new outlets for its transportation and storage capacity. By extending its pipeline services to other sectors, the Louisiana oil port has-unlike its Alaskan counterpart-found solutions to the problem of infrastructural inertia, where high fixed-cost commodity transport systems must seek new sources of revenue, thus compelling the expansion of frontier extraction. With its direct link to deepwater production, loop will continue to play an important role in expanding America's domestic oil supplies for decades to come. 18 Additionally, loop helped launch Port Fourchon, the nation's premier logistical support center for servicing the deepwater Gulf of Mexico. Selected as the location for loop's beach crossing and onshore pumping station, Port Fourchon, a former fishing dock, grew rapidly to become a major port facility with more than a hundred tenants, mostly in the marine transportation industry. Today, Port Fourchon services more than 75 percent of all deepwater exploration and production and over half of the drilling rigs in the Gulf of Mexico. By the turn of the twenty-first century, loop had become a key transport node for both increased oil imports and expanded domestic oil production offshore, thus reshaping oil developments in the larger Gulf Coast region.
loop and the Crisis of Coastal Land Loss
Despite improvements in designs and development activities, loop's environmental achievements did not silence those concerned with bigger problems affecting the coast. If anything, loop helped broaden these coastal issues for a larger public audience at the state and federal levels. The scale of scientific involvement in project planning and the vast amount of useful data produced from this collaborative effort signaled the beginning of a major new initiative to address Louisiana's problem with shrinking wetlands. The crisis of coastal land loss that intensified during the 1980s and 1990s and the efforts to protect and restore Louisiana wetlands have come to define recent energy and environmental history of the Gulf Coast.
Since the 1930s coastal Louisiana has lost approximately 1 million acres of wetlandsan area greater than the size of Rhode Island. Over the last several decades, in the wake of this environmental crisis, oil-field canals have become one of the most controversial issues in the region. Scientists have made it clear that canals are one of a variety of factors leading to wetland loss, but quantifying these effects have been difficult. Four decades of extensive scientific research into the complex environmental problems associated with energy production along the Gulf Coast have led to improvements in technology and environmental management. The science-and scientists-that guided the environmental planning for loop in the 1970s helped bring about significant structural changes in energy and environmental policies in coastal Louisiana and laid the foundation for a major wetland restoration effort still underway.
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June 2012 The Journal of American History Recent events in the Gulf served as a stark reminder of the tension that underlies oil and gas development and environmental safety. Expanding development in deep water under new safety and performance standards while also protecting and restoring the coastal environment are key current issues that echo similar concerns from the past. The imperative to balance national energy security with environmental protection will continue to inform decisions about offshore oil and gas development. The scenes of oil-soaked pelicans-the Louisiana state bird-and devastated marshlands and beaches as a result of the Macondo oil spill presented to the rest of the nation and the world a glimpse of the real environmental and human costs of energy development along the Gulf Coast.
The stakeholders in the Gulf region are at a critical impasse. The decisions being made in the wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon fire and spill will have long-term consequences for energy development and coastal restoration. The importance of scientific input into the political process that will govern the future of the Gulf cannot be overlooked. A history of loop provides a lesson for future approaches to managing oil and gas development and environmental protection along this vital energy corridor. In the case of loop, the strong environmental safeguards adopted at the outset have enabled the facility's owners to lay claim to one of the best safety records in the industry.
The challenges of the 1970s to develop more sources of petroleum with less environmental impact called for a level of environmental planning that had never before been attempted in coastal and offshore Louisiana. To meet these expectations, the planners of loop had to rely on environmental consultants-many of them from universities-to provide the expertise on coastal processes, marsh ecology, salinity levels, and offshore currents. Understanding how this complex environmental system worked became a key factor in determining the proper technologies and procedures necessary to build a major oil port within a fragile ecosystem. Lessons from the 1970s teach us that energy development and sound environmental management practices can coexist. The challenge since then has been-and certainly will be, looking into the future-to bring together advances in environmental planning with novel energy innovations.
